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Abstract. During the period 1996-2003 there were five fatal accidents on the 
UK railway network, three of which were Signals Passed at Danger (SPAD) 
events (Watford Junction, 1996; Southall, 1997; Ladbroke Grove, 1999). SPAD 
events vary in severity and whilst most are not fatal there is the potential to 
cause serious injuries to passengers and train staff and damage to railway infra-
structure. This paper investigates how the current system accident analysis tool 
used within the railway, the Incident Factor Classification System (IFCS) iden-
tifies and analyses causal factors of SPAD events. To evaluate the effectiveness 
IFCS was used to analysis SPAD incident reports (n=46) and the outputs were 
compared with two systemic accident analysis methods and relevant outputs 
(the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System – HFACS and Acci-
Maps). The initial reporting process proved to hinder all systemic accident 
analysis methods in the extraction of causal factors. However, once extracted, 
all system accident analysis methods were successful in categorizing causal fac-
tors and demonstrated various outputs to illustrate the findings.    
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1 Introduction 
A signal passed at danger (SPAD) event is defined as a train passing a red ‘stop’ 
signal into a section of track without authorisation to do so [1]. The consequences of a 
SPAD event can vary depending on the situation, they are categorised using the prob-
ability and severity of potential outcomes and the distance the train travelled past the 
signal. In the highest category (A), SPADs can lead to:  
• Injuries and deaths of both passengers and train staff; 
• Delays within the network costing the train/freight operating company 
(TOC/FOC) money and damaging their reputation; 
• Damage to the train, track or signal costing the TOC/FOC/Network Rail 
money and reputation. 
Lowe and Nock [2] estimated that each category A SPAD costs £22,000, therefore, 
in the year 2007 alone, the annual cost of category A SPADs was £7 million.  The 
potentially severe consequences and regularity provide good reasons for investigating 
SPADs. 
Findings from a literature review identified that research has been carried out to 
improve compliance of drivers and railway staff with reporting regulations and prac-
tices but there is very little research on how the reporting system is structured and its 
effectiveness. Several researchers have highlighted the need to learn from past inci-
dents and near misses [3], [4]. Therefore, this paper will focus on the current SPAD 
reporting system using different analytical approaches.  
1.1 Objectives  
The objectives of this study are to: 
1. Analyse a set of SPAD incident reports (n=46) to determine common con-
tributory findings 
2. Apply and compare the outcomes from using three systematic accident anal-
ysis models to extract and identify common causal factors leading to SPAD 
incidents.  
2 Method 
Network Rail provided access to forty-six SPAD incident reports from eight dif-
ferent train operating companies (TOCs; n=24) and six different freight operating 
companies (FOCs; n=22). All the incident reports provided had already been assessed 
by Network Rail to calculate SPAD risk, all reports were reported as category A.  
Currently the railway industry uses the Incident Factor Classification System 
(IFCS) to analysis incident reports, therefore this method of analysis was chosen 
along with AcciMap and the human factors analysis and classification system 
(HFACS). AcciMap and HFACS methods were chosen based on the findings of a 
review on system accident analysis methods and were deemed to be most suitable for 
the data given. Therefore, all three system accident analysis methods used the same 
forty-six incident reports to allow comparison of the three methods and their subse-
quent results.  
IFCS was developed by a team at RSSB [5] and is used to classify human error 
and identify underlying factors relating to the incident. The aim of IFCS is to support 
and promote key human factor issues in relation to accidents, to allow cross industry 
learning via causal trends. The intended users are incident investigators, to allow inci-
dents with similar causes to be easily accessible so previous work and recommenda-
tions are not repeated or contradicted. Validation of the IFCS was undertaken using 
300 pre-evaluated incident reports and applying the IFCS before being implemented 
within the railway incident investigation process 
The IFCS analysis involves analysing an incident report, highlighting any factors 
which are human error factors or incident factors. These two categories have further 
sub categories. Any factor which can be learnt from and describes a system is an inci-
dent factor; any factor which is due to a human action is a human error factor.  
RSSB have developed specialist computer software to aid the analysis and presen-
tation of the IFCS results. Due to not having access to this software, the 46 SPAD 
incident reports were analysed by two investigators then combined to minimise the 
effects of subjectivity and bias. The relevant factors were provided to the researcher 
on a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet and imported into NVivo for further analysis.  The 
results were then published in table format to allow visual representation of the sub-
categories of the human error category and error type of the incident factor category.  
The AcciMap method was developed by Svedung and Rasmussen [6] to graphical-
ly represent the ‘causal flow of accidents, analyse hazardous work systems and…. 
interactions’.  The AcciMap provides a high level of flexibility within designing the 
levels and categories/conditions, allowing it to suit a wide range of uses and domains 
and making it a very popular analysis tool to use [7].  
For the AcciMap analysis factors were broken down differently to the IFCS analy-
sis. Normally the bottom layer on an AcciMap is a timeline with an ‘individual’ layer 
above, however, due to the AcciMap needing to illustrate the findings of forty-six 
incident reports, a timeline level could not be used. Instead this level was replaced 
with an ‘action layer’ with an ‘individual’ layer above. The ‘individual’ layer shows 
all factors which relate to the individual, be that a driver, signaler or conductor. 
Above the ‘individual’ layer is the ‘team/group’ layer with ‘management’, ‘organisa-
tion’ and ‘environment’ representatively higher. After associating each factor with a 
layer, relationships were then illustrated via lines linking factors together. This stage 
was done on A3 paper before being imported into Microsoft Visio. 
HFACS was developed by Shappell and Wiegmann and is heavily influenced by 
Reason’s Swiss Cheese model [8]. Reason’s Swiss Cheese Model [9] is described as 
four levels of human failure – unsafe acts (active failures), preconditions for unsafe 
acts (latent failures), unsafe supervision (latent failures) and organisational influences 
(latent failures). Each layer influences the next, either positively or negatively and 
when a failure occurs at each layer an accident occurs [10]. The aim of HFACS is not 
to place blame on one factor but to investigate causal factors.  
The HFACS has four identical levels to the Swiss Cheese Model that can be fur-
ther defined using categories similar to the IFCS. Unsafe act is level 1 and is further 
separated into errors and violations, using the terms skill-based errors, decision errors, 
perceptual errors, routine violations and exceptional violations. Level 2 is precondi-
tions for unsafe act which is separated into three categories; environmental factors, 
condition of operators and personal factors. The next level, level 3, is unsafe supervi-
sion; this is broken into inadequate supervision, plan inappropriate operation, fail to 
correct known problem and supervisory violation. The final level to the HFACS is 
organisational influences, with resource management, organisational climate and op-
erational process sub-categories.  
The result of HFACS analysis is a graphic representation of the layers in which if 
one factor malfunctions or fails on each level then an incident can occur. However, by 
highlighting prior to an incident the risk each factor has on the chance of an incident 
occurring, the risk can be reduced. Alternatively, retrospectively conducted HFACS 
will highlight the failed factors so work can be conducted to ensure it cannot happen 
again.  
The forty-six incident reports were analysed and causal factors were categorised 
under the HFAC levels. To allow for editing of factors this was conducted first on a 
whiteboard before computerised using Microsoft Visio.  
3 Results 
3.1 Incident Factor Classification System 
There was a wide distribution of the occurrence of factors throughout the six hu-
man factor categories and ten incident factors. As can be seen in the graph below (fig. 
1) the three human error categories which occurred the most throughout the reports 
are perception slip, decision error, route violation and action slip (n=61; 35; 19 and 19 
respectively). The most common incident factors were personal, communication and 
knowledge, skills and experience factors (n=49, 38, 37 respectively). Factors related 
to the human error categories appeared 168 times through the incident reports, whilst 
228 factors were associated with the ten incident factors.  
 
Fig. 1 - Distribution of occurrence of causal factors 
Fig. 1 also highlights the factors which were not commonly reported within the in-
cident reports. Teamwork appeared in less than 1% of the overall number of factors 
for the incident reports. Information and workload combined covered a mere 7.5% of 
the total numbers. Whilst in the human error categories memory lapse was the least 
mentioned as a causal factor and only covered 8.3% of the total. Each of the catego-
ries were broken down further within the analysis to establish factors which were 
contributory to the incident.  
Perception slip (n=61) is split into ‘error in interpretation of visual stimuli and ‘er-
ror in searching for visual stimuli’ (n=35, n=26 respectively). Most errors in interpre-
tation of visual stimulus were due to the driver responding correctly to the incorrect 
signal (n=23). Of these eleven cases were due to misreading or reading across the 
signal whilst twelve were due to the driver incorrectly predicting what the signal 
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would be. Whilst the most common errors in searching for visual stimulus were more 
spread out across a variety of causes: failure to locate relevant signal/AWS magnet, 
speed restrictions and distraction by other lights were all the most popular causes (n=5 
for each group). In four occasions the driver claimed their focus was on the speed 
restriction rather than the signal, whilst one driver failed to locate the speed restriction 
for the section that the signal was in. Driver distraction due to light stimulus was also 
highlighted as an issue with three occasions of the signal being in the same line of 
sight as another signal and twice a driver became distracted by another light stimulus.  
Decision errors were split into four different groups: error in decision, error in 
strategy, error in judgement and signal predicting (n=8, 6, 7 and 14 respectively). 
Signal predicting is the highest occurring error and arises from a driver reacting to 
what they expect to see rather than what they see. For example, a driver may remem-
ber the normal pattern of signals within an area, so they react to what they are expect-
ing to see, not what is there. Thus, they may not slow the train down appropriately, 
meaning it’s impossible to stop before passing the signal at danger. A common theme 
within the decision error category is that errors are often based on the correct 
knowledge and information and sound recollection but the knowledge and infor-
mation is applied wrong due to the situation. 
The ten incident factors focus on management and system errors and the spread of 
occurrence amongst these factors is more variable than the human error factors. Per-
sonal factors were the most common and are those which can affect an individual’s 
ability to maintain attention and focus resulting in fatigue and/or poor physical and 
mental wellbeing. Fatigue and distraction are the most common causal causes (n=10 
and 12 respectively) due to a range of issues covering complacency, overtime and 
family issues (n=1, 2, 4 respectively). Interestingly, less breakdown was available of 
causes for this factor in comparison to the human error categories. Most reports which 
mentioned fatigue as a factor did not mention the cause of the fatigue (n=6). 
Issues due to verbal communication were separated during analysis to before and 
after the occurrence of the SPAD event. Errors which occurred before the incident 
predominately lie in communication between the driver and driver manager (n=7), 
with only one case of communication error between driver and signaller. The most 
common errors were within communication of information and knowledge (n=6). 
However, after the incident all but one error was due to the communication be-
tween the driver and signaller (n=13). The reports vary in detail but 77% of errors in 
communication between driver and signaller after a SPAD incident is due to poor or 
lack of communication. Miscommunication was also considered to be a causal factor 
(n=4) but it was not clear from the reports who was involved, just that it occurred 
before the SPAD event. Both before and after the SPAD occurrence there are cases 
where communication guidelines are not followed and either one or multiple people 
within the line of communication fail to repeat back what they have heard before con-
tinuing (before n =7, after n=11). This safe guard is in place to aid communication 
and prevent misunderstanding and poor communication levels. 
3.2 AcciMap 
The complexity of the railway system is reflected in the AcciMap analysis, with 
150 causal human error factors and relationships depicted in the Human Error Acci-
map and 287 causal incident factors and relationships depicted in the Incident Factors 
AcciMap. The two factor groups were categorised into levels and then subsequently 
grouped into common factor groups, where possible any link to an IFCS factor was 
included to help in comparison of the two techniques (fig. 2).  
The human error AcciMap illustrates a skewed distribution of causal factors 
amongst the levels, with more factors present in the action and individual levels. The 
action level contains eleven common factor groups with a subsequent fourteen related 
IFCS factors groups. In total seventy-seven contributory factors were categorised to 
this level. Responding correctly to an incorrect signal due to a perception slip and 
signal predicting caused by decision errors are the most common contributory factors 
at this level (n=23, n=14 respectively). Factors at this level are all direct causation 
contributory factors e.g. the final factor that caused the incident to happen. The indi-
vidual level contains less common factor groups (n=7) and less IFCS factor groups 
(n=10) and covered fifty-eight contributory factors. Decision errors within decision, 
judgement or strategy were the most common (n=21) but within this error three fac-
tors were also routine violations. Errors in decision, judgement and strategy were 
linked to signal predicting, speeding and braking errors within the action level. 
The remaining fifteen contributory factors were spread amongst the remaining lev-
els – group/team, management, organisation and environment. The most common 
IFCS factor group was situation/exceptional violation –violations of procedures and 
rules which are out of the driver control such as issues with late trains, equipment 
failure and poor railhead conditions. This skew in the presentation of contributory 
factors illustrates that many of the contributory factors are related to the individual or 
in this case, the driver and can be seen in fig. 2.  
The AcciMap also highlights the relationships between common factor groups. 
Although interestingly there are limited relationships on an intra level (common factor 
group on one level with another common factor group on same level) throughout the 
AcciMap. Many relationships are on an inter level (common factor group on one level 
with another common factor group on a different level) illustrating that a factor can 
influence factors on other levels (fig. 2).  
The incident factor AcciMap is a lot more complex diagram which at a glance 
shows no skewing towards any level. In comparison to the human error AcciMap 
there is an absence of factor groups within the action and group/team level (n=4, n=6 
respectively), however these two levels still include 58 contributory factors across 14 
IFCS factor groups (table 1). 
Table 1 – Distribution of factors in Incident Factor AcciMap 
 
Level Common Factor 
Group 
IFCS Factors Contributory Factors 
Environment 6 8 13 
Organisation 14 20 42 
Management 14 13 60 
Group/team 6 8 14 
Individual 19 28 114 
Action  4 6 44 
The individual level contains the highest amount of common factor groups, IFCS 
groups and causal factors (n= 19, 28, 114 respectively). No common factor group is 
duplicated from the human factor AcciMap and the most common IFCS groups are 
personal and communication. Personal factors include needing a cold drink, fatigue 
and health and commonly were related to communication due to these personal fac-
tors often not being communicated until an incident has occurred. The abundance of 
relationship lines to and from this level illustrates the influence factors on this level 
have on the factors of other levels.  
Unlike the human factors AcciMap, the management, organisational and environ-
ment levels are more heavily populated. Again, the IFCS factor of communication is 
common within the management level, often being attributed to issues with infor-
mation. Communication issues were most likely to be between driver and signaller 
(n=15) than driver to another railway colleague - driver and driver manager (n=7), 
driver and conductor (n=1). The management level highlights issues with training, 
non-technical skills and scheduling/work load.  
Issues with reporting and equipment faults within SPAD protection equipment, 
trains, railhead, brakes and signals are organisational issues due to the financial and 
organisational aspects behind these factors. Maintenance of current infrastructure and 
finance to upgrade that infrastructure requires planning from a higher level than local 
management. Therefore, unsurprisingly the most common IFCS factors on this level 
are equipment factors and supervision and management factors.  
The environment level demonstrates factors outside the drivers control which can 
contribute to an incident. All common factor groups within this level shared the same 
IFCS factor of work environment, only thirteen examples of the work environment 
being a causal factor were found within the analysis. However, this level has relation-
ship lines to all the other levels, demonstrating how potentially powerful this level is. 
Weather conditions and cab design were common factor groups which are interlinked 
due to temperature, noise and design being common causal factors. It appears from 
the reports that at times of extreme weather the cab design is less than favourable and 
can cause distraction at an individual level. Lighting, both internal and external could 
also be causal due to the interference with signal sighting.  
The incident factor AcciMap illustrates a variety of intra and inter relationships, 
demonstrating that a contributory factor can affect factors both within the same level 
and different level. Therefore, indicating that the incident factors have a higher ability 
to influence more contributory factors.  
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Fig. 2 - Human Error AcciMap. 
 3.3 Human Factors Analysis and Classification System 
A graphical representation of the HFACS is presented in fig. 3, demonstrating how 
incidents occur due to the influence of multiple factors across multiple levels.  
Unsafe act
Preconditions for unsafe act
Unsafe supervision
Organisational influences
Inadequate supervision Plan inappropriate operation Supervisory violation
Failure to correct known 
problem
Skill based errors Decision error Perceptual error
Routine violation
Exceptional violation
Environmental Condition of operators Personal factors
Resource management
Organisational climate
Operational process (management)
Fig. 3 – HFACS 
The ‘unsafe act’ is the final defence layer meaning these are often described as the 
main causation for an incident as it’s the most obvious and what people can see. For 
example, with the use of on-board train recorders it is simple to see if a braking or 
speed error has occurred. Also, drivers within interviews may try to explain why the 
incident happened, often resulting in the cause being stated due to a specific driver 
error. The HFACs analysis categorises potential errors into five main categories 
which coincidentally coincide with the IFCS factors; skill based errors, decision er-
rors, perceptual error, routine violation and exceptional violation.  
For there to be an error to occur within the ‘unsafe act’ level there must have been 
weakness or failings within the previous three levels – preconditions for unsafe act, 
unsafe supervision and organisational influences. Preconditions for unsafe act in rela-
tion to signal passed at danger events include both factors outside the driver’s control 
(environmental factors, condition of operators) as well as personal factors.  
Yet prior to this an error must occur at both the ‘unsafe supervision’ and ‘organisa-
tional influences’ levels. At the highest level (organisational influences) errors include 
planning, budgets and safety culture/climate and can occur on a national scale. Whilst 
‘unsafe supervision’ errors can occur on a local scale due to inadequate supervision or 
supervisory violations, failure to correct a known problem, or planning an inappropri-
ate operation.  
The HFACs model highlights that it is possible for the driver to be doing every-
thing correctly and a SPAD can still occur. For example, issues with signal sighting, 
(preconditions for unsafe act), can lead to the driver not being able to locate the signal 
(unsafe act) as the view is being obstructed by foliage or another signal. This stems 
from the ‘unsafe supervision’ layer of ‘failing to correct a known problem’. But can 
be further linked to the first defence layer of ‘organisational influences’ by poor plan-
ning that the foliage has not been trimmed back (fig. 3). 
4 Discussion 
The incident reports were found to vary in all aspects from detail and content to the 
reporting structure, and also within the same train or freight operating company 
(TOC/FOC). This proved a limiting factor for all analysis methods as analysis could 
only take place on what the railway investigator had written.  
The style of writing within the incident reports varied from a ‘keepsakes’ or note 
style to detailed, cohesive writing. Whilst both styles are valid reporting styles, the 
former aids those who have prior knowledge of the incident, and hinders those who 
do not, as information or description of the incident is limited. Reports in this style 
were often found to state reasons rather than investigate reasons, yet this could be due 
to this information being missed from the report. This ‘unwritten’ content may be 
implicit for those ‘in the know’ but difficult for an unconnected reader to understand. 
For example, in one report under ‘immediate cause’ the following was written ‘the 
immediate cause of this incident was the driver passing…at danger without authority’. 
Whilst providing a definition of a SPAD event it failed to inform the reader of the 
immediate cause to the SPAD. 
The structure varied amongst TOCs and FOCs and sometimes varied between the 
same TOC or FOC. Non-technical skills and IFCS analysis were included in some 
reports but was not a common feature throughout the reports, in some cases the sec-
tions were left blank or the writer confuses the terminology between the non-technical 
skill terms and IFCS terms.  
Therefore, due to the reports being written by experienced employees within the 
railway network, experienced readers will be able to understand the unwritten as-
sumptions, however readers with limited experience could link factors which, in reali-
ty, cannot be linked. However, despite these drawbacks within data extraction, all 
three analysis methods were fruitful in data extraction and categorisation of the sub-
sequent causal factors. The IFCS extracted 396 causal factors from the 46 incident 
reports, whilst the AcciMap analysis extracted 437 causal factors. The HFACs analy-
sis does not quantify any factors but was efficient in categorising the causal factors.  
The IFCS and HFACs analysis provided criteria for categorising factors whilst the 
AcciMap analysis provided a framework to place causal factors. Due to the subjective 
nature of extracting and categorising the factors from the incident reports, there were 
two coders to ensure that each extraction was associated with the correct factor for all 
the methods of analysis. The criteria provided by ICFS and HFACs varied in terms of 
detail, with ICFS providing the most detailed criteria for categorising. Whilst this 
initially aided analysis, there were cases where a causal factor did not fit ‘neatly’ into 
a predetermined term or fitted between two or more terms, groups or levels. When 
similar cases arose in the AcciMap analysis, the causal factor was placed between 
levels to illustrate it should be considered on both levels. The predetermined groups 
within the HFACS analysis are the easiest to use as it allows for duplicate factors to 
appear on the same or other levels. This duplication of factors or presence of very 
similar factors on any level suggests that this factor is a critical causal factor worthy 
of further investigation. 
 It was evident from the results that the methods varied in terms of presentation and 
degree of detail. The AcciMap was the only method of analysis to illustrate relation-
ships on a multiple scale which allows an expanded view of which factors can affect 
the other, albeit not directly showing how they can. Whilst this is positive on an Ac-
ciMap analysis containing few factors, it can complicate and hinder understanding 
when analysing large numbers of factors as seen in the incident factor AcciMap (fig. 
2). IFCS and HFACs do not illustrate relationships but in the case of IFCS this could 
be caused by not having access, therefore not using, the official IFCS analysis soft-
ware and database. HFACs analysis does not illustrate relationships with lines, which 
may be considered an advantage as the user/reader will not be prohibited by visual 
lines that may enable a more thorough investigation of the incident.  
Whilst the HFACS analysis, arguably presents the degree a contributory factor can 
influence other contributory factors, all system accident analysis methods showed this 
to some degree. The HFACS analysis illustrates that whilst a factor may be the factor 
that causes an incident, it is not the only contributory factor. For failing to occur on 
the ‘unsafe act’ level there must be issues and failures on the other three layers. The 
AcciMap illustrates this with the relationship lines and the IFCS demonstrates it by 
the inclusion of the same factors under different categories between the human error 
factors and incident factor groups. 
5 Conclusion 
The incident factor classification system (IFCS), human factor analysis classifica-
tion system (HFACS) and AcciMap methods are successful in highlighting causal 
factors to recent signal passed at danger events on the UK railway network. However, 
as Gibson et al (2013) states when introducing the incident factor classification sys-
tem; the system has been designed so it can be altered to be adaptable to the changes 
within the network. Presuming that no changes to the incident factor classification 
system have been made then although it’s a modern system the addition of further, 
less ambiguous guidelines and definitions could remove some of the subjectivity.  
All the methods have different advantages and disadvantages. A weakness within 
the incident factor classification system is the inability to analyse and record interac-
tion between the factors. This is an advantage of the AcciMap analysis but also a 
weakness, as with complex systems such as the multifactorial nature of the railway 
the diagram can get very complicated and confusing. The HFACS analysis does not 
depict the relationships either but provides the knowledge there must be failures on 
the previous defense layers. A weakness however is that no background or context is 
provided.  
What must be considered when investigating incident reports and methods of 
analysis of incident reports is that what may be the best way of practice for someone 
looking into the system may not suit those that are actually working in the system. 
The findings highlight that there is scope to improve the railway reporting system 
which will in turn aid system analysis. Furthermore, the incident factor classification 
system could be combined with elements from the AcciMap HFACS analyses to 
strengthen this system analysis model. Further studies are underway exploring the 
causal factors of SPAD events and the differences within reporting styles amongst 
TOCs using interviews with key stakeholders.  
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